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Abstract 
 
There now exists a considerable body of literature on the legislative activity of the 
European  Parliament  (EP).  This  has  made  clear  that  today  the  EP  acts  as  an 
effective counterbalance to the legislative power of the Council, across a range of 
policy areas. Central to the EP’s growing effectiveness  is  its strong committee 
system. Where our understanding is less fully developed is in understanding the 
mechanism through which organised interests contribute to this process. This is of 
particular concern given that parliamentary legislators are at a strong informational 
disadvantage compared to their counterparts in the Council and Commission. To 
address  this  issue  the  paper  focuses  on  the  institutional  interface  between 
European Parliamentary Committees and actively participating lobbyists. Here a 
theoretical  argument  is  developed  to  explain  what  determines  which  MEPs 
lobbyists obtain legislative advocacy from. Central to the explanation is the role 
that  institutional  rules  combined  with  a  committee’s  informal  system  of 
organisation  play  in  determining  lobbyists’  strategic  behaviour.  The  analysis 
makes  clear  that  lobbyists  understand  the  distribution  of  influence  among 
committee members, and that associated with greater influence is a requirement 
for  higher  quality  information.    The  empirical  analysis  is  carried  out  on  data 
obtained  from  94  structured  interviews  combined  with  an  original  data  set  of 
committee stage votes.   
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1. Introduction  
  
There  is  an  increasingly  clear  understanding  of  the  strategies  that  organised 
interests deploy to influence public policy in the European Union (Coen, 1997; 
Mahoney,  2004;  Mazey  and  Richardson,  2006;  Bouwen  and  McGowan,  2007; 
Beyers and Kerremans, 2007). Lobbyists’ informational advantages are integral to 
the process, with  both bureaucrats and  legislators demanding  specific expertise 
from reputable organisations (Bouwen, 2002). To build on these insights there is a 
requirement for the  literature to more  fully explain  how  lobbying  behaviour  is 
shaped by specific institutional rules and organisation (Coen, 2007). In particular 
our  knowledge  of  the  institutional  interface  between  European  Parliamentary 
legislators and the activities of organised interests remains far from complete.  
 
The contribution this paper makes is to explain how the European Parliament’s 
(EP)  formal  procedures  and  informal  organisation  interact  independently  with 
lobbyists’  hard  wired  operating  logic  to  structure  the  pattern  of  legislative 
advocacy that takes place. The institutional hub for this activity is the parliament’s 
‘strong’ committee system. Here interests compete to secure legislative influence 
through the incorporation of their informational messages into the final report. The 
analysis demonstrates how an informal subset of the most ‘influential’ committee 
members comes to dominate the process. As such, they are the primary focus for 
interest group activity and work in conjunction with lobbyists to minimise the risks 
of  a  committee  adopting  amendments  (information)  that  it  would  not  have  in 
circumstances of full information. The ‘action’ is played out over three distinct 
phases of the committee process, each of which further prompting lobbyists to 
consider their strategic choices.  
 
In  the  following  section  of  the  paper  pertinent  aspects  of  the  interest  group 
literature as well as that on committee organisation are reviewed. Thereafter the 
argument is developed to explain the means through which EP committees assess 
lobbyists’ informational submissions prior to the committee vote; the implications 
for lobbying behaviour, and the part that institutional rules play in the process. 
Thereafter, the methodological approach will be discussed ahead of an empirical 
examination of the core implications.      4
2. Existing research  
 
A  considerable  body  of  theoretical  and  analytical  research  on  the  legislative 
activity of the European Parliament has become integrated into the main body of 
political  science.  Explanations  have  been  provided  for  voting  behaviour,  party 
competition and  inter-institutional  bargaining. A key reason  for the burgeoning 
academic interest has been the growth in the EP’s legislative importance relative to 
other European Union (EU) institutions, as a result of the adoption and subsequent 
extension  of  the  co-decision  procedure  (Tsebelis  and  Garrett,  2000;  Crombez, 
2001). An observable consequence of this growth in legislative power has been the 
intensification of interest representation directed towards the EP (Crombez, 2002;  
Judge  and  Earnshaw,  2002).  This  is  not  surprising  given  that  active  interests 
seeking to influence legislative outcomes will be among the first to sense shifting 
patterns of legislative power, taking immediate steps to realign their activities in 
response.  
 
The  lobbying  effort  is  directed  towards  influencing  the  parliament’s  inter-
institutional negotiating position, which is defined through the process of adopting 
a  legislative  report.  The  report  is  central  to  the  parliament’s  decision  making 
process (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Selck and Steunenberg, 2004; Hoyland, 2006) 
and, as in the US congressional context, forms the bedrock of committee power. If 
the final report has a level of committee support commensurate to that required for 
an ‘effective’ plenary majority, the report’s rapporteur will present it as a ‘take it 
or leave it offer’ (Tsebelis, 1995). In practice this means that the EP’s negotiating 
position is generally decided in advance of the plenary session (Mamadouh and 
Raunio,  2003).  More  recently  committee  power  appears  to  have  been  further 
extended  through  the  widespread  tendency  for  it  to  cut  formal  deals  with  the 
Council  and  Commission,  ahead  of  the  first  reading  in  plenary;  given  that 
parliament has signalled its commitment to upholding these agreements
1. 
 
                                                 
1 This remains early days, but so far the parliament has not rejected a deal agreed in Trilogue, and 
as such seems prepared to accept the diminished role for the plenary in favour of what is perceived 
as improvement to the EP’s bargaining position with the Council and Commission.          5
This  picture  makes  it  plain  why  lobbyists’  direct  their  attention  towards 
influencing the content of final reports, but our understanding of the mechanism 
through which lobbyists contribute to this process is far less clear. As such there is 
a  gulf  in  our  knowledge  of  what  prompts  committee  members  to  provide 
legislative advocacy as well as in what constraints there are on the effectiveness of 
these actions. Explanations have been given for the attributes and differences in 
the composition of organised interests, i.e. single company, national association 
and  European  association  (Kohler-Koch,  1998;  Wessels,  1999).    In  addition, 
through the  adoption  of  the  practice  of  taking  the  relative  level  of  ‘access’  to 
decision  makers  as  a  measurement  of  influence  (Coleman  and  Grant,  1988; 
Austen-Smith,  1995),  it  has  been  shown  how  the  informational  attributes 
associated  with  particular  organisational  forms  structure  the  pattern  of  access 
afforded by the EU’s principal institutions; with European associations, closely 
followed by national associations, commanding the greatest level of parliamentary 
access (Bouwen, 2002; Bouwen, 2004).  
 
Where the research agenda has moved beyond access and inside the institutional 
setting,  it  is  through  the  adoption  of  the  by  now  widespread  consensus  that 
organised  interests  overwhelmingly  lobby  their  legislative  allies,  occasionally 
engage  with  ‘fence-sitters’,  but  only  rarely  interact  with  their  opponents 
(Baumgartner  and  Leech,  1996;  Kollman,  1997;  Hojnacki  and  Kimball,  1998). 
Crombez (2002) applied this understanding to lobbying behaviour in the plenary. 
His model shows that organised interests attempt to influence policy makers that 
hold similar preferences to their own at the proposal stage, with the aim of creating 
fully conversant advocates; whereas at the vote stage their focus switches to MEPs 
that occupy pivotal positions.     
 
To advance our understanding research must build on what we know about the 
organisational  dynamics  of  committees.  But  even  here  the  literature  remains 
inconclusive,  with  the  persistence  of  rival  explanations  for  the  existence  and 
organisation of ‘strong’ committees, with no one theory fully accounting for the 
complexity of committee behaviour. The two explanations with arguably the most 
enduring  resonance  are  the  information  theories  of  legislative  organisation 
(Cooper,  1970;  Gilligan  and  Krehbiel,  1987,  1989;  Kreibiel,  1991)  and  the   6
distributive benefits theory (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987; Weingast and Marshall, 
1988)
2. The information theories suggest that committee’s operate as agents of the 
floor (plenary) providing expertise on policy outcomes. In contrast distributive 
benefits approaches offer a more self-serving account based on the desire of high 
demanding legislators to secure re-election through the delivery of constituency 
benefits.  
 
The prevalence of either of these simplified typologies would necessitate lobbyists 
to  adopt  corresponding  strategic  behaviour.  But  the  inconclusive  nature  of  the 
literature  mirrors  the  internal  dynamics  of  EP  legislative  committees.  As  such 
competing demands, often based on competing organisational logic is the stuff of 
every day committee life. It is therefore not surprising that for the most part the 
two ‘competing’ theories make identical predictions (Groseclose and King, 2001). 
For this reason research has tended to focus on the extent to which the preferences 
of committee members are aligned with those of the floor.  
 
Not  surprisingly  parliament  has  an  interest  in  ensuring  that  this  outcome  is 
achieved. Hence we find that the composition of EP committees is comparable to 
the  plenary  in  terms  of  party  group  membership,  nationality  as  well  as  in  its 
ideological congruence
3 (McElroy, 2006). However, the establishment that certain 
preferences  are  aligned  is  not  sufficient  to  falsify  the  case  for  constituency 
benefits. This is because, in contrast to the information approach, the theory of 
distributional  benefits  is  premised  on  multi-dimensional  policy  preferences. 
Consistent with this approach, it would be expected that if the signal is sufficiently 
strong, committee members will respond to constituency demands ahead of other 
allegiances. The political cost of this action, particularly if conducted prior to the 
vote  stage,  is  likely  to  be  small.  Evidence  for  the  relative  importance  of  this 
dimension is provided by the high level of EP committee lobbying undertaken by 
                                                 
2 The Majority Party Theory (Cox and McCubbins, 1993) of committee dominance is not discussed 
in this paper given its limited application outside the congressional context. That is to say within 
the EP a majority party system has not emerged and formal rules prevent the exclusion of other 
parties from effective participation. Furthermore as McElroy has noted ‘it is unclear which 
committees, if any, in the EP have targeted externalities and which have uniform and mixed 
externalities’ (p27). This said substantial elements of the Majority Party approach can be reconciled 
with information theories when disaggregated from the committee level. Party groups remain 
central to the parliamentary process. 
3 This is specified in the EP’s Rules of Procedure, in particular rule 152.   7
national  interests  (Wessels,  1999;  Bouwen,  2004)
4;  with  constituency  benefits 
presumably gained often enough to account for the continuance of such demands. 
 
The extent to which committee preferences can be considered to mirror the plenary 
also  remains  unclear.  This  is  because  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the 
distribution of preferences that is observed within committees is in line with the 
distribution  of  influence  held  within  the  committee.  This  disjuncture  has  been 
highlighted with regard to agenda setters (rapporteurs). Here evidence suggests 
that the policy preferences of rapporteurs are skewed from the committee mean 
(Kaeding, 2004). It has also been established that the representation of individual 
national  parties  within  the  parliament  is  at  odds  with  that  found  amongst  the 
population of rapporteurs (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003).   
 
Where committee membership is also at variance with the plenary, yet consistent 
with the information approaches, is in individuals’ higher level of germane prior 
policy interest (Whitaker, 2001) and relevant policy expertise (McElroy, 2006). 
Indeed MEPs make their choice of committee appointment
5 on this basis rather 
than  on  whether  a  particular  appointment  is  of  relevance  to their  constituency 
(Whitaker, 2001).  
 
The  picture  that  emerges  is,  on  the  one  hand  of  a  committee  system  where 
constituency  and  other  partial  demands,  along  with  the  associated  claims  for 
regulatory pork, are woven into the fabric of committee politics; and where the 
preferences of agenda setters systematically diverges from the median member of 
the floor. Whereas on the other hand, the extent that a committee can act on these 
demands  and  remain  effective  is  highly  contingent  on  the  maintenance  of  its 
legitimacy vis-à-vis its principal, the plenary. This raises the questions of: How do 
committees maintain their legitimacy in the face of their members’ demands for 
the incorporation of lobbyists’ informational messages into the final report?  
 
 
                                                 
4 Consistent with Bouwen’s theory it was shown that European associations achieved the most 
access to committee members with a composite ranking of 1.71, but a strikingly similar level of 
access was also achieved by national associations (1.69).  
5 Whitaker (2001) suggests that 88% of MEPs are assigned to their preferred choice of committee.   8
3. Theory 
 
The  strategic  behaviour  of  lobbyists  and  the  extent  to  which  their  information 
submissions are accepted by the committee is to a significant extent determined by 
a  combination  of  the  committee’s  formal  rules  of  operation  and  its  informal 
principle of organisation. Together they contribute to determining how legislative 
influence is distributed amongst committee members and hence to the structure of 
lobbying activity. The formal rules provide a temporal punctuation to a report’s 
passage,  through  the  provision  of  three  distinct  opportunities  for  lobbyists  to 
influence the committees evolving  legislative position.  A salient  feature of the 
informal  organisation  of  EP  committees  is  that  the  distribution  of  influence 
amongst members is skewed, in favour of policy contingent elites. A function of 
these  highly  influential  loose  groupings  is  to  challenge  information  that 
undermines  the  committee’s  reputation.  It  follows  that  this  has  a  considerable 
impact on the effectiveness of the relationships that form between lobbyists and 
committee members. Lobbyists that are active participants in a policy area will be 
fully aware of the distribution of influence within committees and factor this into 
their strategic calculations. This leads us to two clear predictions that underpin the 
argument: 
Prediction one: 
Within each policy area a subsection of committee members exercise 
significant influence over the final report.  
Prediction two: 
Actively  participating  lobbyists  understand  the  distribution  of 
legislative  influence  that  exists  between  individual  committee 
members.  
 
3.1 Formal operating procedure 
The committee stage of the legislative process begins when a proposal is received 
from the Commission and concludes when the committee adopts its final report. 
The committee’s formal rules divide the passage of legislation into three distinct 
phases, each of which provide lobbyists with particular opportunities to influence 
the  final  position.  At  each  phase  lobbyists  and  committee  members  alike  are 
confronted with a new or revised legislative agenda.    9
 
The  agenda  for  the  first  phase  is  provided  by  the  Commission’s  legislative 
proposal.  At this phase a rapporteur prepares a ‘draft report’ on the proposal. By 
convention  the  rapporteur  is  left  to  prepare  the  report  in  isolation  from  her 
legislative peers
6. The principal source of information available to the rapporteur is 
drawn from the avalanche of information submissions made by organised interests, 
as well as by the more active national representations and regulators. The draft 
report together with the un-amended sections of the Commission’s proposal forms 
the agenda for the second ‘open amendment’ phase, where committee members 
(and other MEPs) are free to submit amendments. The third stage of the process is 
the compromise phase. More commonly referred to as the vote stage, this is the 
period  when  backroom  deals  are  put  together  ahead  of  the  final  vote,  often 
reducing the latter to a formality
7. The three phases are summarised below in table 
1. 
 
 
 
3.2 Informal organisation 
In common with standard information assumptions, committees seek to minimise 
their level of uncertainty over the outcome of their policy prescriptions. A failure 
to reduce uncertainty would clearly undermine a committee’s ability to achieve its 
policy goals. But it would also harm the committee’s reputation with the plenary, 
thereby reducing its future policy discretion and hence power. If uncertainty is 
minimised committees are free to conduct the transaction of ‘normal’ left/right 
politics,  as  well  as  a  transparent  trade  in  territorial  demands.    Uncertainty  is 
                                                 
6 The rapporteur generally writes the report in conjunction with her administrative assistant and a 
member(s) of the committee’s secretariat. The division of labour differs widely between reports, 
along with a corresponding shift in lobbying attention. 
7 A feature common to all legislative procedures later analysed in this paper is that the most 
contested areas of legislation (as measured by the density of amendments) were generally 
characterised by prearranged compromises. 
Table 1   Developing the agenda
  Agenda Phases   Origin of the agenda
1 Draft Report  The Commission 
2 Open Amendment  Rapporteur (and Commission)  
3 Compromise Members that submitted amendments, including the Rapporteur     10
reduced  through  the  acquisition  of  private  information  on  the  consequences  of 
policies. 
 
The challenge for EP committees is to assess the implications of a considerable 
volume of legislative amendments submitted by committee members on behalf of 
lobbyists.    This  problem  is  heightened  given  that  compared  to  national 
parliaments, the EP is considerably less resourced and has a legislative programme 
that  is  altogether  more  technical
8.  Because  the  level  of  legislative  complexity 
significantly  exceeds  the  general  level  of  committee  member  comprehension, 
committees respond to the threat of unforeseen policy implications through a form 
of  sub-committee  specialisation
9.  This  is  far  from  a  collective  action  but  a 
consequence of individual actions, whereby influential members provide a level of 
scrutiny  that  lessons  the  likelihood  of  the  committee  adopting  a  technically 
deficient or overtly biased negotiating agenda. The result is that relatively small 
clusters of legislators are able to exert disproportionate control over a committee’s 
legislative  output,  and  as  such  they  represent  the  primary  nodes  for  lobbying 
activity.  
 
Their  influence  is  part  and  parcel  of  their  initial  decision  to  become  active 
(Wawro, 2000), with their expertise honed on the job. This influence is felt across 
the  full  range  of  committee  interactions,  where  they  are  able  to  provide  a 
formidable level of advocacy for their own policy positions, and mount challenges 
to others. The forums for this activity include committee meetings before and after 
the draft report phase; compromise meetings during the compromise phase, and 
within party group meetings throughout the process
10. In addition they are more 
likely to occupy the formal party positions of shadow rapporteur (if not rapporteur) 
when they fall within their field of special interest, providing further opportunities 
to  apply  influence  both  within  their  own  group  and  during  the  process  of 
trialougue.   
                                                 
8 This partly reflects the pronounced regulatory character of EU policy making but is also 
indicative of a parliament that lacks the power of initiative and is therefore compelled to ‘button 
down’ the legislative detail. 
9 The implication is that policy expertise can be disaggregated below the level of the committee 
(McElroy, 2006) 
10 Opposing amendments are frequently fielded by fellow group members, with party positions 
often fixed only after these encounters.   11
In comparison, a committee member outside the influential set is less likely to 
have  the  capacity  to  undertake  this  form  of  advocacy;  lacking  the  contextual 
knowledge and reputation to withstand the spotlight, which burns brighter for the 
outsider.  Here  direct  participation  in  the  process  is  often  limited  to  faxing  an 
amendment(s) to the secretariat. Their amendments tend to be successful when 
opposition  from  the  more  influential  members  is  weakest,  with  party  group 
coordinators  and  other  office  holders  anxious  to  dispel  accusations  of  cartel 
behaviour. 
 
3.3 The implications for lobbying behaviour  
For the most part lobbyists aim to shape an aspect of a committee’s negotiating 
position.  This  may  be  in  response  to  the  Commission’s  proposal,  perhaps 
reflecting an earlier failure to convince, or in response to subsequent changes to 
the agenda. Essential to this process is the decision over which legislator(s) to 
lobby, and at what point in the process this should occur.  But common across all 
lobbying  communities  is  the  hard  wired  operating  mantra  that:  it  is  most 
advantageous  to  lobby  at  the  earliest  available  point  in  the  legislative  process 
(framing the debate); lobby those with the most influence over the policy outcome; 
and  lobby  legislators  that  are  likely  to  be  sympathetic  to  your  position 
(friends/allies), as opposed to the possibly counterproductive action of lobbying 
legislative foes. However, achieving the end goal of making the ‘message stick’ is 
of course partially contingent on the quality of the information, as it needs to be 
sufficiently compelling to motivate the target legislator. 
 
When lobbyists seek to challenge the agenda set by the Commission, the formal 
procedures are such that on occasions lobbyists’ operating logic is challenged. The 
earliest point which influence can be applied in the formal Committee process is at 
the draft report phase, but with agenda setting power concentrated in the hands of 
a single individual it is far from certain that the rapporteur will be a legislative 
friend. Therefore if the lobbyist is faced with an unfriendly rapporteur he will be 
forced to choose between the otherwise compatible logics of lobbying only his   12
legislative allies
11 or to follow the accepted wisdom amongst practitioners; that it 
is more effective to act early in a given legislative process than it is to attempt to 
change the terms of the debate later.  
 
For  lobbyists  the  cost  of  foregoing  early  participation  is  higher  than  the  costs 
associated with lobbying a legislative foe. To an extent the costs more generally 
attributed to lobbying a foe are mitigated by the rapporteur’s strategic incentive to 
incorporate certain otherwise disagreeable information into her report, in order to 
secure sufficient committee support
12. To this effect lobbying a rapporteur that is a 
legislative  foe  often  takes  place  in  the  shadow  of  a  later  intervention  by  an 
influential legislative ally.   
 
The  second  open  amendment  phase  provides  lobbyists  with  considerably  more 
scope to influence a committee’s agenda. With the procedural bottleneck removed, 
lobbyists are free to seek advocacy from all committee members. The effect of this 
extension of direct legislative participation is that the provenance of an organised 
interest, although continuing to structure the set of available MEPs (legislative 
friends),  for  the  most  part  ceases  to  limit  the  prospect  of  a  lobbyist  attaining 
legislative  advocacy.  However,  with  influential  legislative  friends  applying  an 
additional level of scrutiny lobbyists continue to face constraints, but in this case 
informal. This was expressed succinctly by a lobbyist from the insurance industry 
who stated that, “it is never a problem to find a legislator to put forward your 
amendment, but it is a different matter when it comes to finding one that is capable 
of convincing others to vote for it”.   
 
If a lobbyist does receive support from a legislator ‘capable of convincing others 
to vote’, they will willingly pay the additional informational costs associated with 
this form of advocacy. This is because the additional information is commensurate 
with  the  more  active  part  that  influential  legislators  play  in  advancing  their 
position. This can be thought of as analogous to a ‘legislative subsidy’ (Hall and 
                                                 
11 See Baumgartner & Leech, 1996; Kollman, 1997; Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998; Crombez, 2002 
& Hall and Deardorff, 2006. 
12 Failure to build sufficient committee support results in the rapporteur losing her agenda setting 
power, as witnessed on the occasions when the rapporteur votes against her own report during 
plenary.   13
Deardorff, 2006), as these legislators typically lack the resources to fulfil the scale 
of their legislative ambition.  
 
During the  final compromise phase the role of new  information  is confined to 
reinforcing existing submissions or to counteracting changes to the agenda made 
during the previous phase
13. But in contrast to the previous phase, lobbyists are 
faced with a diminished pool of potential legislative allies. This is because the less 
influential members have faded from view, leaving negotiations to those better 
equipped.  Therefore  both  courses  of  action  are  largely  confined  to  lobbying 
influential friends. In the case of counteracting newly revealed opposing positions, 
this activity is contingent on a lobbyist locating a likeminded influential legislator 
to subsidise. 
 
The ways in which lobbyists’ decide which legislator to lobby and at what phase in 
the process are summarised in figure 1. At the draft phase a lobbyist’s likelihood 
of achieving success is highest with a friendly rapporteur [1]. If the rapporteur is 
known  to  be  a  legislative  foe,  although  suboptimal,  she  would  nonetheless 
represent  the  next  best  option  [2].  If  unsuccessful  at  the  draft  report  phase, 
lobbyists will continue to seek the incorporation of their message in the second 
open  amendment  phase.  If  the  information  is  of  sufficiently  high  quality  an 
influential  friend will  be approached [(3)]. If the  information  is of  insufficient 
quality or it is rejected, a non-influential friend will be sought out [(4)]. Legislative 
foes  will  not  be  approached  in  the  second  phase.  If  a  lobbyist  brings  new 
information to the committee at the second phase, the process is identical to that 
for  a  first  stage  rejection;  with  the  quality  of  the  message  determining  which 
category of legislative friend will act as advocate; influential [1] or non-influential 
[2].  Third phase activity is confined exclusively to influential friends [1]. 
                                                 
13 It is permissible for MEPs to submit Oral amendments up to the last minute, but it is more 
common for the threat of such action to be a feature of negotiations.   14
Figure 1  Submitting new information
Phases Who to Lobby
Draft Report Rapporteur
Friend                        Foe
1                              
2
Open Amendment
Friend                                      Foe
Influential  non-influential       influential  non-influential
1(3)               2(4)                     /                    /   
Committee member
Compromise Committee member
Influential  non-influential       influential  non-influential
Friend                                      Foe
1                   /                          /                    /   
 
 
 
4. Research design 
 
To  overcome  the  limitations  associated  with  explaining  informal  behaviour,  a 
mixed research strategy has been adopted. This has combined a programme of 
survey  interviewing  of  representatives  from  94  organised  interests
14,  with  data 
collected on the committee stage amendments for five co-decision reports. The 
primary focus of the research was the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee 
(Econ  committee);  with  additional  comparative  interviews  conducted  in  the 
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee.  
 
The interviewees are a non-random sample of practitioners defined as regular and 
prominent participants in their respective policy arenas. The principal aim was to 
capture, as complete as possible, a population of interests active in a substantive 
policy sector. To this effect, of the 65 interests defined as active in the area of 
financial  services,  63  agreed  to  be  interviewed.  The  remaining  31  survey 
interviews were conducted within the chemical and environmental policy areas. A 
full list of survey questions used in this paper is detailed in appendix A. 
                                                 
14 The interviews were conducted between 2007 and 2008.   15
  
The selection of participants was conditional on their status verified by at least two 
individuals  from  differing  sectors  of  the  policy  community  i.e.  two  from  the 
following  three:  MEP/MEPs  assistant;  member  of  the  EP  secretariat;  or  a 
previously verified organised interest. In practice each organised interest was the 
subject of several nominations (average 3.01). The process of verification took 
place through a further 37 interviews. These institutional interviews included ten 
MEPs, representing five member states and four party groups; two former MEPs; 
six assistance to MEPs; seven party group advisors, from the three principal party 
groups;  and  twelve  mid-ranking  officials  from  the  European  Parliament’s 
Secretariat,  who  were  directly  involved  with  the  preparation  and  passage  of 
committee stage legislative reports. In addition to providing direct insights these 
interviews were conducted to verify the plausibility of all interest group answers, 
although the size of the sample remains too small to report. 
 
The dependent variable ‘interest group rank’, captures who lobbyists believe are 
the  most  influential  legislators  in  the  policy  field.  It  was  derived  from  the 
responses of organised interests to a question that asked them to determine which 
MEPs they believed had the most influence at the committee stage following the 
presentation of the draft report. In all, 53 organised interests provided results. The 
scores for each MEP that was cited are detailed in appendix B. The variable is 
made up of 57 observations, of which 33 have positive values, and 24 take the 
value 0 (mean = 4.6) With these characteristics the dependent variable is most 
accurately described as a count outcome and as such the more commonly applied 
OLS technique is inappropriate and likely to lead to biased outcomes. Furthermore 
given  that  the  conditional  variance  is  significantly  greater than  the  conditional 
mean,  as  indicated  by  the  likelihood-ratio  test  of  alpha  =  0,  then  a  negative 
binomial regression provides the most appropriate technique
15.  
                                                 
15 The use of the standard Poisson model in this instance would result in a downward bias in the 
standard error terms potentially resulting in an incorrect (z- value) rejection of the null hypothesis. 
In contrast the negative binomial regression model permits the conditional variance to exceed the 
conditional  mean  by  estimating  the  conditional  mean  as  a  random  variable  derived  from  the 
independent variables and a random error term uncorrelated with the mean. As a consequence of 
the random error term ‘unobserved heterogeneity’ is introduced allowing variance to take place on 
the  dependent  variable  in  circumstances  when  observations  of  the  same  value  occur  on  the 
independent  variable:  Long,  Scott  J  (1997).  Regression  Models  for  Categorical  and  Limited 
Dependent Variables. London, Sage.   16
Two explanatory  variables were defined as of particular  interest to the theory: 
‘successful  amendments’  and  ‘success  rate’.  They  were  both  constructed  to 
provide measures of actual MEP success and hence legislative influence. In the 
absence  of  roll-call  data,  information  on  vote  outcome  was  compiled  through 
unofficial access to committee compromise agreements and final voting lists, in 
conjunction  with  certain  publicly  available  data
16.  In  total  2155  ‘open 
amendments’ were submitted. The range of individual submissions was between 1 
and 178
17. The five legislative reports that were analysed were on the legislative 
proposal for directives on:  the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit 
institutions  -  Basel  II  (2005);  payment  services  in  the  internal  market  (2006); 
UCITS (2008); Solvency II (2009); and Capital Requirements (2009).  
 
The independent variable ‘successful amendments’ measures the overall number 
of  successful  amendments  that  an  MEP  makes  relative  to  other  participating 
MEPs. If an amendment was adopted at the vote stage it was coded as 1, and if it 
failed it was coded as 0. For the significant number of amendments that formed 
part  of  wider  compromise  agreements  and  were  voted  through  as  part  of  this 
package,  the  individual  outcome  was  not  always  discernable.  Therefore,  in 
conjunction  with  individuals  closely  involved  in  the  procedure,  the  relevant 
amendments were analysed and assessed according to the same coding system but, 
where  an  amendment  was  only  partially  included  in  the  compromise  a  coding 
value of 0.5 was awarded. These scores were allocated to each MEP as before. The 
total was 1330, with a range between 1 and 126. This information was derived 
through  unofficial  access  to  the  committee  voting  lists  and  compromise 
agreements of the legislation under consideration. A possible draw back with this 
approach is that the level of failure is not taken into account. To mitigate against 
this latter problem, a variable was created to capture individual MEPs ‘success 
rate’ at submitting amendments.   
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16 The legislative information was collected between 2007and 2009. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/amendmentsCom.do?  
17 Where amendments were jointly submitted they were attributed in proportion i.e. if three MEPs 
jointly submitted they were credited with 0.33 of an amendment.   17
A series of dummy control variables were added to the model. The first two relate 
to positions of authority within the committee and take the value of 1 if an MEP is 
an office holder and 0 if not. Here the position of ‘party co-ordinator’ is included 
because this role specifically involves brokering legislative agreements within the 
respective  European  party  groups. The  variable  ‘committee  chair/vice  chair’  is 
included in order to capture the effect of seniority within the formal committee 
structure. The remaining dummy variables are confined to party membership. Here 
the  two  principal  trans-national  party  groups  are  reported:  ‘EPP’  (European 
Peoples  Party)  and  ‘PES’  (Party  of  European  Socialists).  The  party  reference 
category is made up of all other European party groups, including the ‘ELDR’ 
(Liberals). 
 
5. Findings 
 
The  argument  that  has  been  put  forward  explains  certain  aspects  of  lobbying 
behaviour within European parliamentary committees. The explanatory variables 
are  the  committees’  formal  operating  procedures  and  informal  organisation. 
Together they interact to structure the pattern of lobbying behaviour. This section 
of  the  paper  tests  the  core  implications  that  follow  from  the  theoretical 
explanation. The analysis continues to follow the temporal course of the legislative 
process.  
 
5.1 The draft report phase  
This  section  of  the  analysis  assesses  the  extent  to  which  influencing  the  draft 
report phase represents the primary goal for lobbyists that are active at this point in 
the process; and the extent to which they are detracted from pursuing this strategy 
if the rapporteur is known to oppose their policy position.  
 
To assess the significance of the draft report phase, interviewees were initially 
asked at what stage in the committee process they would  ideally  like to begin 
lobbying (see appendix A, question1). All those that responded stated that of the   18
three phases they would want to be active in the first
18. However, to some extent 
the situation that was put before them was artificial, as it was clear that actively 
participating  interests  would  have  had  some  contact  beforehand.  Indeed  the 
committee  itself  generally  plays  a  part  in  lobbying  the  Commission  ahead  of 
receiving the proposal. 
 
However, the more interesting question is whether lobbyists defect from lobbying 
the rapporteur in circumstances where she is a legislative foe. This prompted the 
question:  
‘If you know in advance that the rapporteur opposes the position of 
your organisation, to what extent if any does this fact prevent you from 
directly putting forward your policy position?’  
The results, which are summarised in table 2, confirm the expectation that lobbyist 
rarely shirk from lobbying a rapporteur that happens to be a legislative foe. More 
than  half  of  the  lobbyists  that  answered  stated  that  the  policy  position  of  the 
rapporteur had no bearing on their decision to lobby; with no lobbyists claiming 
that it always structured their decision.  
 
Table 2   How often interests defect from lobbying a rapporteur that they know to 
be in opposition to their policy position 
 
  Interests 
Non 
Financial 
Interests 
Financial 
All 
interests 
Percentage of 
respondents 
making 
assessment 
Always (100%)  0  0  0  0 
More than 75% but less than always  0  2  2  4.5% 
More than 50% but less than 75%  1  3  4  9% 
Less than 50% but more than 25%  0  4  4  9% 
Up to 25%  3  8  11  25% 
Never  9  14  23  52.3% 
Unable to assess  3  4  7  - 
Total  16  35  51  100% 
  
                                                 
18 Of the 94 interviewees, 86% identified the draft report phase as the most advantageous phase to 
apply influence. The remaining 13 declined to give an answer; with the persistent suggestion that 
the reality was too complex to be broken down to a single point in time.    19
This situation was confirmed through interviews with MEPs, and members of the 
secretariat
19; with several committee members expressing surprise that whilst they 
were acting as rapporteur, they were often approached by lobbyists from sections 
of the policy spectrum that they had openly criticised in the past. One member 
from the Socialist group complained that on occasions,  “they threaten that  if I 
don’t include their position, the report will be picked apart during committee”. The 
implication here is that not only does the lobbyist have wider support, but also that 
without taking account of this position the draft report may face wider challenges.  
 
5.2 The significance of the open amendment phase   
The argument places considerable emphasis on the open amendment phase of the 
process, after all this and the subsequent phase are where the committee’s informal 
organisation  directly  interacts  with  the  formal  procedure.  But  a  nagging  doubt 
remains,  that  these  phases  simply  do  not  matter  and  that  power  rest  with  the 
rapporteur. Two  distinct  approaches  have  been  taken  to this  question  with  the 
additional aim of providing a wider insight into the lobbying process.  
   
The first approach builds on the previous analysis and looks beyond the intention 
to lobby and attempts to capture the dynamic nature of the process, through asking 
lobbyists to consider both their failed interventions at the draft phase as well as 
their response to subsequent changes to the agenda. The question that was asked 
was:  
‘With regard to the co-decision legislation that your organisation has 
been  actively  involved  with,  what  percentage  of  your  legislative 
concerns, that you were ultimately able to raise in committee, were 
you able to directly convey to the rapporteur prior to the completion 
of the draft report?’ 
The proportion of interviewees that were able to make an assessment was reduced, 
reflecting the added complexity of the question, but the implication was clear. The 
results summarised in table 2 show that when interests were asked to consider the 
full  range  of  their  legislative  concerns  that  they  raised  in  the  course  of  the 
committee process, half of all interests that answered (52.3%) stated that less than 
                                                 
19 The sample size was too small to report.    20
half of these issues were conveyed to the rapporteur prior to the completion of the 
draft report, with no respondent claiming 100% success. 
 
 
Table 3  Percentage of  informational  messages  that were conveyed during the   
committee stage that were first conveyed during the preparation of the draft report  
 
 
 
Non 
Financial 
Interests 
Financial 
Interests 
All 
interests  
Percentage  
for all  
respondents  
 
All (100%)  0  0  0  0 
More than 75% but less than all  4  14  18  26.9% 
More than 50% but less than 75%  5  12  17  25.4% 
Less than 50% but more than 25%  6  12  18  26.9% 
Up to 25%  4  10  14  20.9% 
None  0  0  0  0 
Unable to assess  12  15  27  - 
Total  31  63  94  100% 
 
It follows that the second and final phase of the process (open amendment and 
compromise) received the majority of ‘new’ information submissions. But to an 
extent this simply measures the volume of traffic, rather than the frequency of 
collision. However, through analysing the outcome of all amendments that were 
made to the two legislative procedures under consideration i.e. those made by the 
rapporteur in the draft reports as well as the subsequent open amendment phase, 
the relative importance of the two phases can be assessed.   
 
To illustrate this, from the overall total of 2854 amendments submitted to the five 
legislative  procedures,  just  699  were  contained  within  the  rapporteurs'  draft 
reports; and many of these were of a purely administrative nature. Of course the 
higher level of second phase activity could simply be background noise. However 
when the number of ultimately successful ‘open amendments’(2155) is compared 
with those submitted at the draft report stage the successful open amendments 
exceed those put forward in the draft report by a factor 3 to 1. Of course many of 
the draft amendments were themselves unsuccessful. This suggests that at the very 
least the lobbying activity that takes place during the open amendment stage has a   21
comparable effect on a committee’s final position to that which takes place during 
the draft report phase. 
 
5.3 Testing the underlying predictions 
From the outset it was apparent that at the core of the argument lay two underlying 
predictions.  If  the  first  prediction  failed  to  hold  the  system  of  informal 
organisation could not exist. Similarly, even if the first assumption were shown to 
hold, the anticipated lobbying response would remain contingent on the second 
underlying prediction. 
Prediction one: 
Within each policy area a subsection of committee members exercise 
significant influence over the final report.  
Prediction two: 
Actively  participating  lobbyists  understand  the  distribution  of 
legislative  influence  that  exists  between  individual  committee 
members.  
 
To assess these two predictions, we can measure the extent to which lobbyists’ 
assessment of influential committee members (‘interest group rank’) correlates 
with their actual levels of influence. That is to say, do lobbyists target influential 
MEP’s, who have significant influence in their policy area? In order to measure 
the predictions two specifications of the model have been constructed. Model 1 
incorporates the explanatory variable that shows the overall number of ‘successful 
amendments’ made by MEPs, whilst model 2 includes the variable that illustrates 
a legislator’s amendment ‘success rate’
20. Both models include control variables 
for  party  group  (‘PES’  and  ‘EPP’)  as  well  as  for  ‘party  co-ordinator’  and 
‘chair/vice chair’.   
 
The results from the first model show that of the five explanatory variables, three 
have significant explanatory power in explaining the variance in perceived level of 
MEP  influence.  The  variable  of  particular  interest  to  the  theory,  ‘successful 
amendments’, is both significant and in the right direction. The results show that 
                                                 
20 Whilst the correlation between these two explanatory variables is acceptable at 0.34, their 
independence remains questionable.   22
for a one unit increase in the number of ‘successful amendments’ that an MEP 
achieves, her ‘interest group rank(ing)’ is expected to increase by a factor of 1.04, 
holding all other variables constant.
21  
 
The party group variables were also of significance and in a positive direction. The 
results show that for an MEP that is a member of the EPP, his expected ‘interest 
group rank(ing)’ increases by a factor of 2.31 relative to the reference category of 
smaller parties, holding all other variables constant. The corresponding expected 
rate of increase for a member of the PES relative to the reference category is a 
factor of 2.77. This suggests that lobbyists underestimate the smaller parties, or 
more  likely  concentrate  their  efforts  on  the  most  influential  MEPs  which 
disproportionately come from the two main parties. What is interesting is that the 
difference in the way that lobbyists’ evaluated the two largest party groups appears 
comparatively small.  
 
In the second model two of the explanatory variables are significant, including 
‘success rate’. Here the results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the 
rate of success that an MEP achieves with their amendments leads to an expected 
increase in the number of organised interest that state that an MEP is influential 
(interest group rank) by a factor of 1.04 holding all other variables constant. 
 
The control variable ‘committee chair/vice chair’ was also of significance. The 
results indicate that the effect of holding a committee office increases the expected 
‘interest group rank(ing)’ by a factor of 3.57, holding all other variables constant. 
This finding, although not present in the alternative specification of the model, is 
not surprising given that seniority  is associated with a  high  committee profile. 
Therefore it is plausible to suggest that to an extent lobbyists are seduced by the 
trappings of authority, causing them to overstate the legislative influence of senior 
office holders. However, care must be taken as this variable consists of just three 
observations. 
 
                                                 
21 This effect is linear in the log of observed influence count , thus is multiplicative rather than 
additive.   23
The results from the two models have clear implications for the predictions under 
analysis  and  therefore  for  the  theory  as  a  whole.  The  assessment  made  by 
organised interests considering the legislative influence of MEPs in their specific 
policy area is fully commensurate with the observable actions of legislators in the 
policy field under analysis: Organised interests understand which legislators have 
the most influence over a committee’s negotiating agenda, and it follows that there 
exists a sub-set of influential committee members. Arguments can be made for the 
primacy  of  one  specification  over  the  other  in  terms  of  their  embodiment  of 
‘influence’.  However,  it  seems  likely  that  interests  take  both  variables  into 
account, although the explanatory power of the second model, which incorporates 
‘successful amendments’, appears to be greater.  
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Table 4     Negative binomial model: Organised interests' assessment of the most
                  influential MEPs in the Economic and Monetary Affairs committee.
Model 1 Model 2
Incident rate 
ratio Z-Score
Incident rate 
ratio Z-Score
Successful Amendments 1.038*** 6.55
(0.006)
Success Rate 1.042*** 3.43
(0.012)
EPP 2.315** 2.36 1.74 1.15
(0.823) (0.837)
PES 2.766*** 2.61 1.841 1.08
(1.080) (1.038)
Party Co-ordinator 1.152 0.28 3.253 1.36
(0.589) (2.186)
Committee Chair/Vice Chair 1.008 0.02 3.569* 1.75
(0.474) (2.588)
Number of Observations 57 57
Log-likelihood -108.574 -126.831
LRχ
2(5) 58.28*** 21.76***
Pseudo R
2 0.211 0.079
LR test α = 0 34.39*** 176.8***
Notes: ***significant at 0.01 level, **significant at 0.05 level, *significant at 0.1 level.
Standard errors in parenthesis
 
 
5.4 Who not to lobby 
There was no question that when faced with choice, lobbyists only approached 
their legislative friends. To illustrate this, when the names of the legislators that 
were considered to be most influential were given, it was invariably the case that 
unbidden  they  would  point  out  legislators  from  this  list  that  they  would  not 
approach.  Hence  a  lobbyist  from  a  regional  banking  association  stated  of  one 
influential MEP that she “would always take the line of the international banks”, 
and was therefore off limits; whereas for another it was claimed that he would 
“first seek the opinion of the city of London institutions before agreeing to act, in 
particular……
22”.  
 
                                                 
22 Here two London based trade associations with international membership were cited.   25
To elicit whether there were circumstances when lobbyists felt the quality of their 
informational  message  was  insufficient  quality  to  pass  the  scrutiny  of  an 
influential legislator, a further direct question was asked:     
 
‘If the content of their requests for legislative action was ever such 
that it was more appropriate to seek action from legislators outside the 
set of committee members that you defined as influential?’  
 
The response rate was much lower, with just 44 out of the 83 interviewees putting 
forward an answer. This reflected the intense sensitivity surrounding this line of 
enquiry
23. However 38 (86.4%) respondents revealed that there were occasions 
when they ‘preferred’ to deliver their informational message to MEPs outside their 
set of  most  influential  legislators. The  implication  from this  is that suboptimal 
information quality forces organised interests to defect from obtaining advocacy 
from their ‘most influential’ ‘legislative allies’
24.  
 
This leaves it slightly unclear why lobbyists approach legislators with seemingly 
little chance of affecting the committee position. The explanation is that lobbyists 
themselves  have  no  choice  over  whether  to  put  information  forward,  but  with 
knowledge of the legislative hierarchy that is unlikely to be known ‘back home’, 
they  have  an  interest  in  exercising  ‘quality  control’  in  order  to  preserve  their 
reputation.  The  response  to  the  above  question  was  consistent  with  this 
explanation. However it also seems likely that on occasions interests simply knock 
on a series of friendly legislators doors in a descending order of influence, until a 
legislator agrees to provide advocacy
25. After all, even less influential legislators 
achieve success sometimes.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 In fact several lobbyists got quite annoyed, at the suggestion that they made such strategic 
choices.  
24 It is assumed that the origin of the overwhelming majority of amendments are from organised 
interests and that where this is not the case the origin is more likely to be from the population of 
more technically adept ‘effective’ legislators.  
25 The origin of amendments from less influential members was particularly well known, indicating 
that on some occasions they had been put forward before.   26
6. Discussion 
 
The  analysis  has  shown  how  institutional  conditions  shape  the  legislative 
partnerships  that  form  between  lobbyists  and  EP  committee  members.  The 
Committees’  informal  organisation  and  formal  operating  procedures  interact 
independently with lobbyist’s operating logic to determine the relationships that 
form.  
 
The implication for the EU lobbying literature is that what we know about the 
strategic behaviour of lobbyists in the plenary (Crombez, 2002), does not hold for 
the  often  more  decisive  Committee  stage.  The  committee’s  formal  operating 
procedures  are  such  that  at  the  proposal  stage,  lobbying  is  not  confined  to 
legislators that  have  similar  preference  to their  own  (friends).  Although,  if  we 
assume  that the  ‘open  amendment’  phase  is  more  comparable  to the  plenary’s 
proposal stage, then we find that the assumption that only legislative friends are 
lobbied holds across both venues.  
 
However, this explanations turns out to be insufficient to fully explain lobbying 
activity in EP committees. This is because as a consequence of the committee’s 
informal organisation it is the ‘quality’ of an information message that structures 
which legislative friends will act on a lobbyist’s behalf. The committee’s informal 
organisation also structures the final compromise phase. Here lobbying attention is 
shown to deviate from the expectation that immediately ahead of the vote only 
pivotal legislators are targeted, towards ‘influential’ legislative friends. 
 
Through highlighting an aspect of a committees’ informal organisation, it has been 
demonstrated  how  relatively  small  clusters  of  legislators  are  able  to  mitigate 
aspects  of  the  committee’s  informational  disadvantages,  thereby  exerting 
considerable  influence  over  the  outcome  of  the  committee  process,  and  by 
implication  the  final  legislative  outcome.  As  a  result  attempts  to  move  the 
committee position to a point beyond which its legitimacy vis-à-vis the plenary is 
threatened are challenged. It has been made clear that lobbyists understand this 
distribution of influence amongst committee members, along with the associated   27
demands for higher quality information necessary to secure legislative advocacy 
from more influential legislators. 
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Appendix A  List of all interview questions used. The exact wording of which, 
was often contingent on the interview 
 
1.  ‘In  an  ideal  world  at  which  point  in  the  committee  process  would  you 
begin concerted attempts to influence the legislative outcome?’ 
2.  ‘If you know in advance that the rapporteur opposes the position of your 
organisation, to what extent if any does this fact prevent you from directly 
putting forward your policy position?’ 
3.  ‘With regard to the co-decision legislation that your organisation has been 
actively involved with, what percentage of your legislative concerns, that 
you were ultimately able to raise in committee, were you able to directly 
convey to the rapporteur prior to the completion of the draft report?’ 
4.  ‘If the content of their requests for legislative action was ever such that it 
was  more  appropriate to  seek  action  from  legislators outside  the  set of 
committee members that you defined as influential?’  
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Appendix B  Interest Group Rank
Most Influential MEPs: Number of Independent
Citations given by 52 Organised Interests
Name of MEP
No. of 
Independent 
Citations
KLINZ, Wolf 34
GAUZÈS, Jean-Paul 28
BOWLES, Sharon 22
PURVIS, John 19
RADWAN, Alexander 19
KAUPPI, Piia-Noora 18
BERÈS, Pervenche 13
van den BURG, Ieke 11
GOTTARDI, Donata 10
GARCÍA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL, José Manuel 8
HOPPENSTEDT, Karsten Friedrich 8
KARAS, Othmar 7
LULLING, Astrid 7
BECSEY, Zsolt László 5
FERREIRA, Elisa 5
STARKEVI I TĖ, Margarita 5
ETTL, Harald 5
VISSER, Cornelis 5
PITELLA, Giovanni 4
GOEBBELS, Robert 3
MITCHELL, Gay 3
RYAN, Eoin 3
SÁNCHEZ PRESEDO, Antolín 3
SKINNER, Peter 3
EVANS, Jonathan 2
LAUK, Kurt Joachim 2
RAPKAY, Bernhard 2
WARTMANN-KOOL, Corien 2
BULLMANN, Udo 1
HÖKMARK, Gunnar 1
SCHMIDT, Olle 1
de VITS, Mia 1
LIPIETZ, Alain 1
Total 261  
 
 
 
 
 
   30
Bibliography 
 
 
Austen-Smith, David (1993). “Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence”. Journal of 
Politics 55: 41-56. 
Baumgartner, Frank R. and Beth L. Leech (1996). "The Multiple Ambiguities of 'Counteractive 
Lobbying'." American Journal of Political Science 40(2): 521-542. 
Beyers, Jan and Bart Kerremans (2007). “Critical resource dependencies and the Europeanization 
of domestic interest groups” Journal of European Public Policy 14(3): 460-481. 
Bouwen, Pieter (2002). "Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: The Logic of Access." 
Journal of European Public Policy 9(3): 365-390. 
Bouwen, Pieter (2004). "The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in 
the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs." Journal of the Common Market 
Studies 42(3): 473-495. 
Bouwen, Pieter and Margaret McGowan (2007). “Lobbying verses litigation: political and legal 
strategies of interest representation in the European Union” Journal of European Public 
Policy 14(3): 422-443.  
Bowler, Shaun and David M. Farrell (1995). "'The Organization of the European Parliament: 
Committees, Specialization and Co-ordination'." British Journal of Political Science 
25(2): 219-43. 
Coen, David (1997). “The evolution of the large firm as a political actor in the European Union”, 
Journal of European Public Policy 4(1): 91-108. 
Coen, David (2007). “Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying”, Journal of European 
Public Policy 14(13): 333-345. 
Coleman, William and Wyn Grant (1988). “The organisational cohesion and political access of 
business: a study of comprehension associations”, European Journal of Political Research 
16: 467-87. 
Cooper, Joseph (1970). The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the 
Modern House. Houston, Texas; Rice University Studies  
Cox, Gary W. and Matthew D. McCubbins (1993) Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the 
House, Berkeley: University of California Press 
Crombez, Christopher (2001). 'The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Co-decision Procedure'. The 
Rules of Integration: Institutional Approaches to the Study of Europe. G. Schneider and 
M. Aspinwall. Manchester, Manchester University Press: 101-122. 
Crombez, Christopher (2002). "'Information, Lobbying and the Legislative Process in the European 
Union'." European Union Politics 3(1): 7-32.  
Gilligan, Thomas W. and Keith Krehbiel (1987). “Collective Decision Making and Standing 
Committees: An Informal Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures”. Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Organization. 287-335.  
Groseclose, Timothy J. and David C. King (2001). “Committee Theories Reconsidered”. Congress 
Reconsidered 7
th Edition. Lawrence C.Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Congressional 
Quarterly Press.  
Hall, Richard L. and Alan V. Deardorff  (2006). Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, American 
Political Science 100(1): 69-84. 
Hix, Simon (2002). "'Parliamentary Behaviour with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and 
Voting in the European Parliament'." American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 688-9. 
Hojnacki, Marie and David C Kimball (1998). "Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to 
Lobby in Congress." The American Political Science Review 92(4): 775-790. 
Hoyland, Bjorn (2006). "'Allocation of Codecision Reports in the Fifth European 
Parliament'."European Union Politics 7(1): 30-50. 
Judge, David and David Earnshaw (2002). "'No Simple Dichotomies: Lobbyists and the European 
Parliament'." Journal of Legislative Studies 8(4): 61-79. 
Kaeding, Michael (2004). Rapporteurship Allocation in the European Parliament. Information or 
Distribution? European Union Politics 5(3): 353-371. 
Kohler-Koch, Beate (1998). Organised Interests in the E.U. and the European Parliament. 
Lobbying, Pluralism and European Integration. P. H. Claeys, C. Gobin and P. Winard. 
Brussels, European Interuniversity Press. 
Kollman, Ken (1997). "Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and 
Congressional Committees." American Journal of Political Science 41(2): 519-544.   31
Krehbiel, Keith (1991). Information and Legislative Organisation. Ann Arbour. University of 
Michigan Press.  
Long, Scott J (1997). Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. 
London, Sage. 
McElroy, Gail (2006). Committee Representation in the European Parliament, European Union 
Politics 7(1): 5-29. 
Mahoney, Christine (2004). “The power of institutions. State and interest group activity in the 
European Union” European Union Politics 5(4): 441-466. 
Mamadouh, Virginie and Tapio Raunio (2003). ‘The Committee system: Powers, Appointments 
and Report Allocation’, Journal of Common Market Studies 41(2): 333-51. 
Mazey, Sonia and Jeremy Richardson (2006). ‘Interest groups and EU policy making: 
organisational logic and venue shopping’ J. Richardson European Union: Power and 
Policy-making, London and New York, Routledge. 
Moe, Terry M (1980). The organisation of interests. Chicago, Chicago University Press. 
Olson, Mancur (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the theory of Groups. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Selck, Torsten J. and Bernard Steunenberg (2004). "'Between Power and Luck: The European 
Parliament in the EU Legislative Process'." European Union Politics 5(1): 25-46. 
Shepsle, Kenneth A. and  Barry R.Weingast (1987). “The Institutional Foundations of Committee 
Power”. American Political Science Review 81 (March): 85-104. 
Truman, David B. (1951). The Governmental Process. New York, Knopf. 
Tsebelis, George (1995). "Conditional Agenda-Setting and Decision Making inside the European 
Parliament." Journal of Legislative Studies 1(1): 65-93. 
Tsebelis, George and Geoffrey Garrett (2000). "'Legislative Politics in the European Union'." 
European Union Politics 1(1): 9-36. 
Wawro, Gregory (2000). Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House of Representatives. Ann 
Arbour: University of Michigan Press.  
Wessels, Bernard (1999). European Parliament and Interest Groups. The European Parliament, the 
National Parliaments; and European Integration. R. S. Katz and B. Wessels. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
Weingast, Barry R. and William J. Marshall (1988). “The Industrial Organisation of Congress; or, 
why legislatures, like firms, are not organised as markets.” The Journal of Political 
Economy 96 (1): 132-163. 
Whittaker, Richard (2001). “Party Control in a Committee-Based Legislature? The Case of the 
European Parliament”. The Journal of Legislative Studies 7(4): 63-88. 
 